We analyze firm survival determinants in four new European Union member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). We employ the Cox proportional hazards model on firmlevel data over the period of 2006-2015. We show that less concentrated control of large shareholders, higher solvency, and more board directors are linked with increased probability of firm survival in all four countries. However, an excessive number of board directors shows a detrimental effect. Firms with foreign owners and higher returns on their assets exhibit better survival chances. On the other hand, larger firms and those hiring international auditors show lower probabilities of survival. A number of determinants specifically influence firm survival in different ways across countries. This fact emphasizes that differences in business conditions are important when studying firm survival.
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Introduction
The economic reforms of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were aimed at creating competitive market economies and more efficient enterprises by firm restructuring, privatization, and supporting institutional reforms (Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007) . Large numbers of new firms were entering the market at that time, and while firms' entry might be quite easy, their survival on the market was often difficult (Geroski, 1995) .
This fact is particularly important for firms from the new member states of the European Union (EU) that first had to go through an uneasy transformation process before their EU accession (Estrin et al., 2009 ) and almost immediately had to cope with the global financial crisis (GFC) that, in general, negatively affected their performance (Hanousek et al., 2015) . Hence, the existence of healthy companies and knowledge of the determinants of firms' failures are particularly vital in new EU countries, especially from the long-term perspective of European integration, employment, and economic growth.
However, firms from the new EU states, and emerging markets in general, are underrepresented in empirical survival analyses. Therefore, in this paper, we aim to contribute to the literature and analyze firm survival in four new EU members: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
We chose the four countries based on several criteria. The first institutional criterion is related to foreign trade. As early as December 1991, the former Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary signed the so-called "Europe Agreements" with the European Union. These countries have striven to establish a workable framework for international trade and cooperation. Such an arrangement was institutionalized in March 1993 in the form of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), consisting of founding countries the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland (and Slovenia) . Second, the formation of the CEFTA reflected the importance of international trade as a means of economic coordination, mirrored in the high degree of economic convergence achieved among the four countries already in the late 1990's (Kočenda, 2001; Kočenda et al., 2006) . Third, already in the early 1990s, the four countries formed a cultural and political alliance, called the Visegrád Group, for the purposes of furthering their European integration, along with economic and energy cooperation. Fourth, all four countries adopted relatively expedient privatization programs and transformed into market economies more effectively, as compared to other transition countries (Estrin et al., 2009) . Fifth, as an attestation of similarity in their economic developments, and after complying with the acquis communautaire, all four members of the Visegrád Group joined the European 2 Union on May 1, 2004. Sixth, the four countries are key participants in the international East-West production networks in Europe (Frensch et al., 2016) . Hence, the four countries form a relatively homogenous group of economies that share common features in terms of their economic advancement that is also mirrored in their production structures.
The lack of empirical survival analyses in emerging markets might be caused by data limitations. To overcome this defect, we build an extensive data set of 41,496 firms paired with a set of potential determinants of firms' exits and deliver a corporate survival analysis in the four new EU members. In this way, we fill an existing gap in the literature that studies and identifies factors that potentially impact firms' ability to survive.
Most of the survival studies focus on financial variables in order to predict corporate distress (Kumar and Ravi, 2007) . However, especially in small and medium companies, financial statements might be quite misleading. This is not meant solely in the sense of fraudulent accounting practices (Koskivaara, 2004) , but also in terms of "creative accounting" or "cooking the books" within the legal limits. According to Kirkos et al. (2007) , financial statement fraud costs US businesses around $400 billion annually. As noted by Hajek and Henriques (2017) , financial fraud may be an effective indicator of substantial financial problems that cause bankruptcy. Hence, there exist many reasons why it might be difficult to predict companies' distress using their own financial statements.
Perhaps that is why there is still no broadly accepted single method of evaluating a company's financial health. Apart from a wide set of utilized variables, research methods also vary greatly and range from statistical methods, through neural networks, decision trees, and fuzzy logic to many other artificial intelligence and soft computing techniques; Kumar and Ravi (2007) provide an excellent survey of the methods, data sources, and financial ratios frequently employed when evaluating corporate financial health.
In this paper, we proceed in line with a resource-based theory of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and intentionally do not (primarily) focus on financial variables. Hence, we deviate form a mainstream use of financial variables to assess firm survival, and we contribute to the existing literature by focusing on a wide set of firm survival determinants that characterize a firm from various angles. We employ some indicators that are quite widely used in other empirical studies (firm performance, linkage with capital market, firm size and age). However, our contributive focus rests on our additional employment of variables that are much less frequently used and downright sparsely employed in analyses targeting emerging markets. These are indicators that 3 capture firm characteristics related to their legal form, ownership structure, corporate governance, and business organization. To make our analysis easy to compare with other studies, we apply the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) , which is by far the most commonly used model in empirical firm survival literature (Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod, 2008) .
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we analyze a fairly homogenous group of countries that experienced transition from planned to market economies and managed to join the EU rapidly after their transformations. Second, our analysis is based on a representative set of firms from various industries, and industry-specific effects are accounted for. Further, our time span covers both the GFC and post-crisis periods. Third, we analyze firm survival with a rich set of determinants that characterize firms from various angles. Specifically, in terms of the empirical evidence, we detect several factors that increase the probability of firm survival in all new EU states under research: namely the Number of large shareholders, the Number of board directors, and the Solvency ratio.
Both Foreign ownership and Returns on assets (ROA) are determinants with a positive effect on firm survival in all countries except Slovakia. As for risk factors that lower the probability of firm survival in all countries, we have identified two determinants-the Number of board directors and, surprisingly, Firm size-for all countries except Hungary.
Several other determinants have a specific influence in each of the countries of this study.
The most surprising result is that employing an International audit firm lowers the probability of firm survival (with the exception of Hungarian firms). Several other determinants exhibit a specific influence in each of the countries in the study. This fact emphasizes that differences in business conditions are important when studying firm survival. Further, some of our results are in contrast to those reported in studies from developed markets and show the necessity of studying firm survival in emerging markets in detail.
In the rest of the paper, we review related literature in Section 2 that is followed by a description of the data and the employed methodology (Section 3). We present our detailed results along with empirically supported inferences in Section 4. The last section is a brief conclusion.
Related studies
Since the seminal work of Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968) , there has been a considerable amount of research examining firm failure and survival (for relevant reviews, 4 see Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod, 2008) . Hence, we present an overview of studies that are directly related to our analysis and deliberately do not cover less relevant parts of the firm survival literature. To our knowledge, Harhoff et al. (1998) conducted the first study to consider a company's legal form as an indicator of riskiness and to establish its empirical impact on growth and firm exit. They used the Cox proportional hazards model based on a sample of approximately 11,000 West German companies operating in all major economic sectors. They showed that limited liability companies have higher insolvency rates than those with full liability.
Some determinants of firm survival might already be considered as stylized facts, such as firm age and size (Geroski, 1995 (Geroski, , 2010 . Buehler et al. (2006) confirmed that larger firms have lower hazard rates of exiting than smaller firms, and the same applies to size, i.e., bankruptcy rates decrease with age. Esteve-Pérez and Mañez-Castillejo (2008) found that the probability of exit for larger firms is about 32-39% lower than that of small firms. They also confirmed that firm age is important for explaining firm survival; however, the effect is not straightforward. They observed a relatively unusual relationship between the hazard rate and age, i.e., the risk of exit is high in the early days of a firm, then decreases before increasing later.
Another stylized fact inferred from the abundant empirical evidence is that firm survival depends on the industry in which the firm operates (Dunne et al., 1989) ; naturally, expanding industries have better survival rates (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001) . Financial health and firm performance are obviously important determinants of firm survival (Görg and Spaliara, 2014) . Also, access to external financial resources positively impacts firm growth and survival (Musso and Schiavo, 2008) . Recently, Guariglia et al. (2016) used in their models the ratio of shareholders' funds to total assets (i.e., solvency) as a control variable, and it proved to be positively associated with firm survival in all cases.
Ownership structure appears to be a significant factor for firm survival, as suggested by Bridges and Guariglia (2008) -based on a sample of UK firms, they confirmed that global engagement (i.e., foreign owned or exporting company) enhances survival probabilities. Many European countries, especially these new ones, have active policies for attracting foreign direct investment; however, as stated by Mata and Portugal (2002) , benefits from foreign direct investment are more relevant with higher rates of survival of foreign-owned firms and the greater ability of foreign firms to overcome obstacles to survival.
Firm survival literature focusing on firms' governance is rather sparse. Among the first, Gilson (1990) focused on the ownership and board composition of firms in default 5 or bankruptcy. Daily and Dalton (1994) found the relationships among governance structures and corporate bankruptcy quite significant and concluded that corporate governance structure is a good predictor of a company's financial distress. Later on, Dalton et al. (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of 54 empirical studies addressing board composition and 31 studies of board leadership structure and their relationship to firms' financial performance. Only slight evidence of a systemic relationship between governance structure and financial performance was provided.
The effect of ownership concentration is "theoretically complex and empirically ambiguous" (Earle et al., 2005, p. 254) . In fact, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that the presence of large shareholders who have a strong incentive to monitor and discipline top management can help avoid the traditional "free-rider" problem associated with ownership dispersion, thus mitigating firm failure (i.e., the alignment hypothesis). This argument, however, is intensely refuted by Claessens et al. (2000) , who pointed out that because large shareholders exercise control rights to maximize their profits, they can put the firm at risk of management failure (i.e., the expropriation hypothesis). Due partly to the ambiguity of the above-mentioned theoretical debates, empirical results regarding the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance presented by previous studies are diverse in their content and views (Wang and Shailer, 2015) . Accordingly, the impact of ownership concentration on firm survival is also theoretically unpredictable.
Using the Cox proportional hazards model and a sample of 125 Australian firms, Chancharat et al. (2012) showed that the survival time of the initial private offerings (IPO) of the "new economy" firms is positively related to board independence. Moreover, company size and leverage are found to be negatively correlated with firm survival. In particular, the board of directors and the audit committee were identified as determinants with vital roles in reducing the potential exit risk. In addition, these two papers also suggested and partly verified the positive effects of the auditor's reputation and the quality of the external audit on firm survival.
Business organization is also regarded as an influential factor of firm survival. A series of studies regarding industrial organization provides evidence that the business network and diversification of a firm tend to keep the firm alive, ceteris paribus (Staber, 2001; Agarwal and Gort, 2002; Kimura and Fujii, 2003; Kosova and Lafontaine, 2010) . This is because these two factors can potentially allay business risk caused by external 6 shocks. Thus, we also expect that the degree of business networking and diversification is positively related to firm survival in the new EU countries.
The list of related studies is far from exhaustive but quite clearly shows that the results are highly sample dependent. Thus, to establish the effect of governance on firm survival, in particular, it is beneficial to update, from time to time, the empirical results using the latest data coming from different industries and different countries.
All survival determinants under our consideration are summarized in Table 1 , along with their expected effects. The effects are based on the summary of the prevailing effects found in the existing empirical literature surveyed above. To quantitatively assess the effects of firm survival determinants, we formulate a general hypothesis, H0: A specific determinant does not affect firm survival. The formal hypothesis can be understood in terms of a firm's exit probability as well due to our use of the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) . As such, a firm exhibiting a specific characteristic (determinant) has lower exit probability. More details on the quantitative assessment are provided in Section 3.2.
Data and methodology
Data: Indicators and coverage
In our empirical analysis, we employed data from Bureau van Dijk's Orbis database for 41,496 firms from the new EU member states. We covered firms that satisfied two conditions: (i) they were actually operating at the end of 2006 (just before the GFC erupted), and (ii) they provided their survival status information at the end of 2015.
1 Of these 41,496 firms, a total of 5,682 failed during the examined period (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) ; hence, the exit rate was 13.7%. Further, for some companies, ownership and/or financial data were incomplete, and we were not able to trace them from other sources. Therefore, in our estimations, we used a set of 36,498 primarily medium and large firms from the Czech Republic (12,203), Poland (13,836), Hungary (6, 976), and Slovakia (3, 483) . 1 We obtained these 41,496 companies using Orbis 2006 archive data and checked their survival status by referring to the website database during the second half of 2016. The 2006 archive data contain 10 times more companies in our four countries of interest. However, due to a large number of dropouts after 2007 and other technical reasons, we were not able to trace the survival status of many firms at the end of 2015. However, this issue does not constitute a serious selection bias because an overwhelming majority of the untraceable firms are one-person businesses, micro-enterprises, and small firms. Hence, our empirical evidence relates primarily to medium and large companies, which is in accord with our research strategy.
Further, we collected an adequate set of company-specific variables that can be considered determinants of firms exiting the market. They come from seven different categories: legal form, ownership structure, corporate governance, firm performance, linkage with capital market, firm size and age, and business organization. The collected determinants are widely employed and established in the literature; as such, they allow for the direct comparison of our results with relevant studies performed on firm survival in developed markets. More details about the data are provided in Table 2 .
In terms of the legal form, we distinguish five categories: joint-stock companies, limited liability companies, partnerships, cooperatives, and other legal forms. These are the key ownership categories, with limited liability companies being the most numerous.
Other legal forms is the least represented category in the sample, and, as such, it is considered to be a default category for which we do not report a direct effect. The ownership categories are constructed as mutually exclusive dummy variables.
We capture the most important aspects of ownership structure with four important categories: number of large shareholders, foreign ownership, central state ownership, and regional state ownership. The number of large shareholders characterizes the concentration of control in a firm. From Table 2 , we see that, on average, firms are dominated either by a single shareholder or a pair of blockholders. As this variable quantifies ownership power, it is not restricted to private ownership only. The state may be included in this category if the government is a dominant shareholder or a blockholder.
We created this particular category of ownership control because it was empirically shown that dominant owners and blockholder groups exert important effects on firms' performance in the European context (Hanousek et al., 2012 (Hanousek et al., , 2015 . Other categories distinguish private foreign ownership from two forms of state ownership, and they are defined as mutually exclusive dummy variables.
In our list of factors, corporate governance is represented by three recognized variables that play a key role, as shown in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . First, we include a number of board directors, as more than one director limits the potential misuse of management power in a company. Second, the number of audit committee/board members (shortened to number of auditors) provides important information on the level of oversight and safety checks within the company. Third, we include a dummy variable for firms that employ an international audit firm in an attempt to further improve their corporate governance or are simply required to do so by law (Sucher and KosmalaMacLullich, 2004) . 8 Firm survival is intuitively closely related to firm performance (Shiferaw, 2009 ).
We capture this factor with two widely used (financial) performance measures: returns on assets (ROA) and profit margin. ROA percentage is calculated as [(profit before tax/total assets) × 100]. Profit margin is computed as [(gross profit/operating revenue) × 100]. Both measures capture different aspects of firm performance: ROA provides information as to the productivity of a firm's capital, while profit margin shows a firm's relative profitability.
Further, we employ various firm characteristics that elucidate important aspects of firm status. The linkage of a firm with capital market is captured by two factors: a dummy variable for firms listed on capital market and a solvency ratio calculated as [(shareholders' funds/total assets) × 100]. Then, we use the total assets to measure the firm size and number of years a firm has operated to capture its age. Finally, we trace the business organization of firms: the number of subsidiaries is a quantitative factor that defines a firm's network or the extent to which a firm spreads its business activities via its subsidiaries; business diversification is a qualitative factor that captures the variety of activities a firm is engaged in based on operations in different double-digit industries.
Methodology: Cox hazards model
The effects of various determinants on firm survival will be analyzed using the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) . The underlying idea behind the model is to estimate the probability that an event of interest will not have occurred by certain time, in our case, firm survival. Assuming that T is a continuous random variable with probability density function f(t) and cumulative distribution function F(t), the probability of surviving beyond the time t is given by the so-called surviving function:
(
As an alternative, we define a hazard function h(t), denoting the probability of an event (firm exiting the market) during the next small interval of time:
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The survival and hazard functions provide alternative but equivalent characterizations of the distribution of T. Following the procedure of Hosmer et al. (2008) , the relationship between h(t) and S(t) can be established as:
The Cox proportional hazards model assumes that the baseline hazard h0(t) depends on time t and a set of relevant covariates xin:
where β1, β2,…, and βn are the parameters to be estimated. Specification (4) defines the hazard rate at time t for subject i, which depends on a vector of covariates x.
Further, we consider two observations, i and i, that differ in their covariates (xvalues), with the following linear representation:
The hazard ratios for these two observations are then independent of time t, and they are defined as:
Since the baseline hazard h0(t) depends only on time t, it can take any form, while covariates enter the model linearly. Therefore, the Cox model is a semi-parametric model, and no matter how the survival time T is distributed, estimates from the Cox model are robust.
Estimates of parameters β are obtained from the maximum likelihood estimation of the logarithmic transformation of specification (4), which is represented by the following linear model:
Each parameter β represents a hazard ratio that we will interpret in the same way as did Iwasaki (2014). Specifically, a hazard ratio indicates how the probability of a firm exiting the market is multiplied when a specific covariate (e.g., firm survival determinant in a form of an independent variable) changes by one unit. If an estimate is over 1.0, we may consider a determinant (covariate) to be a risk factor causing the firm exit. Similarly, if an estimate is below 1.0, such a determinant (covariate) is considered a preventive factor inhibiting firm exit from the market.
All determinants (covariates) employed in our analysis are summarized in Table 2 , along with their descriptive statistics. Poland; this evidence correlates with the fact that post-crisis analyses of firm and industry levels in the EU consider 2009 to be an initial post-crisis year (Hanousek et al., 2015 (Hanousek et al., , 2017 . Another drop in economic activity resulting in negative GDP growth occurred in 2012, but only in the Czech Republic and Hungary; although the other two countries experienced stagnation. This has also been translated into higher exit rates of new EU firms.
Results
To give a better perspective, in Appendix In the next subsections, we will discuss the results we obtained from using the Cox proportional hazards model. Construction (Section F), and Services (Sections G-S).
Legal form
When all countries are analyzed jointly, a company's legal form is a significant factor affecting firm survival. However, in terms of statistical significance, the results differ across countries. In Slovakia, only the Limited liability form is a significant factor, and it decreases the probability of survival as the estimated hazard ratio is over 1. A lack of statistical significance associated with a legal form hints that other factors are more important in driving the ability to survive in the Slovakian business environment. In
Hungary and Poland, the legal form of Joint-stock company is a significant preventive factor as it lowers the probability of a firm exiting the market; this is in opposition to Czech firms, for which all legal forms represent a risk factor.
When all countries are analyzed jointly, the results correspond to those of EstevePérez and Mañez-Castillejo (2008) , who concluded that limited liability firms survive longer. However, this does not hold for in the Slovakian and Czech environments. This finding is in line with a strand of previous findings that limited liability firms have higher insolvency rates than those under full liability (Harhoff et al., 1998) . Such a discrepancy clearly demonstrates that determinants of firm survival may have different effects in various countries.
Results for specific industries are a little bit more straightforward (see Table 4 
Ownership structure
The Number of large shareholders is a significant preventive factor in all countries, i.e., ownership structure is a preventive factor for all industries, although the Number of large shareholders in Agriculture is not significant, and Foreign ownership is not significant in the Construction industry.
Corporate governance
Hazard ratios are significant for both the Number of board directors and its squared term.
The results show that the relationship between the variable and firm survival exhibits an inverted U-shaped pattern: i.e., the probability of exit for firms with larger boards is low, 2 Kočenda and Hanousek (2012) showed that state control resulted in the decline and even negative corporate performance of firms where the state was engaged through various means of control. On the other hand, state ownership and control in the Czech Republic decisively declined after 2001 in favor of domestic, foreign, or mixed ownership. Hence, post-crisis firm survival development should be affected by state control to much lesser extent than before.
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and then it increases to reach a peak and eventually prompts an increase in the probability of failure as the board gets larger. This finding is in line with outcomes based on the meta-analysis of Dalton et al. (1998) .
The effect of the Number of auditors is significant only in the case of Hungary.
However, the hazard ratio shows that the number of the audit committee members exhibits a positive effect because it increases the probability a firm will survive. More interestingly, if a firm employs an International audit firm, this significantly increases the probability of the firm's exit in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. Especially Results for industries are not that strong; higher ROA lowers the probability of firm exit in Services and Mining and manufacturing, while Profit margin lowers it only in Agriculture.
Linkage with capital market
Joint stock companies listed on a local stock exchange are more closely monitored than the rest. Whether a firm is Listed or not only matters in the case of Poland, where the stock market is the largest in the entire Central and Eastern European region in terms of the number of listed companies, liquidity, and market capitalization. However, our results suggest that Polish listed companies have a lower probability of surviving than non-listed firms. In developed markets, the opposite should be true. For example, Tsoukas (2011) showed that traditionally used measures of financial development significantly influence firm survival. The finding corresponds to the fact that larger and more liquid stock markets enhance firms' survival chances due to their access to capital. Solvency ratio (computed ratio of shareholders' funds and total assets) exhibits a straightforward effect, as it improves firms' survival chances in all countries and in all industries as well. Overall, access to external financial resources has a positive effect on the growth of firms (Musso and Schiavo, 2008).
Our results should be viewed in light of some specifics posed by the new EU stock markets. Stock markets in these countries have been established as vehicles to support the privatization process of state-owned enterprises when former command economies began pursuing market reforms (Megginson and Netter, 2001) . As such, they ended up with a large number of listed companies, but with insufficient liquidity (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003; Baumöhl and Lyócsa, 2014) . Despite the fact that the new EU stock markets being researched have been the most liquid as well as the largest in terms of 15 market capitalization in the region (Égert and Kočenda, 2007) , these markets are still less suited to providing capital and might exhibit properties different from those of developed stock markets elsewhere. As such, a firm being listed on an emerging stock market does not necessarily need to exhibit a higher probability of survival as compared to evidence from developed markets. Moreover, as noted by Iwasaki (2014), the global financial crisis caused considerable damage to listed and bond-issuing companies through a significant capital crunch and/or unrealized losses on assets.
Firm size and age
We have mentioned that company size and age might already be considered stylized facts and they should have a positive effect on firm survival (Geroski, 1995; Buehler et al., 2006; Esteve-Pérez and Mañez-Castillejo, 2008) . However, our results indicate that in new EU member countries, the probability of exit for larger firms is higher than for smaller ones; this result holds for all industries except Agriculture, where the coefficient is not significant. Based on the information presented in Tables 3 and 4, this result is clearly not specific to a country or industry, as none of the coefficients indicates an opposite effect.
This finding is indirectly supported by Hanousek et al. (2015) who found that larger EU firms can be associated with less efficiency in general. Less efficient firms are then naturally prone to increased exit risk that might be driven by higher bureaucracy, higher communication costs, and a greater resistance to change in large firms as compared to smaller firms. Thus, Firm size (the natural logarithm of total assets) comes as a determinant with an opposite effect on firm survival than one would expect based on the results of other empirical studies analyzing companies from different countries. As such, our findings underline the necessity of conducting firm survival research on firms from emerging markets.
Further, the Age of a firm appears to be a statistically insignificant factor across countries. This finding resonates with the results of Hanousek et al. (2015) , who reported that the age of EU firms only negligibly affects their efficiency. In terms of industries, firm age shows some positive effects for improving the survival of firms operating in Service activities.
Business organization
A firm might spread its business activities via its subsidiaries. The number of subsidiaries, then, defines the extent of the Business network variable. This factor is shown to lower the failure probability in the Czech Republic and Poland; hazard ratios in the other two 16 countries are not significant. With respect to industries, this is also the case for Agriculture, Mining and manufacturing, and Services. Business diversification helps firms survive in the Czech Republic, but it is not a significant factor in other countries.
For firms in Agriculture, diversification also lowers the probability of their exit, which is a reasonable result, given the highly cyclical and weather-dependent nature of this industry.
Robustness check
We performed two additional exercises to assess the robustness of our results presented in Sections 4.1-4.7. We re-estimated the Cox hazards model with different assumptions on survival distribution, including the exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, log-normal, loglogistic, and generalized gamma distributions. Further, we considered some aspects of the firms as potentially relevant for our survival analysis. For example, La Porta et al.
(1999) used 20% as a threshold for control of a company. This widely accepted threshold theoretically allows for a maximum of 5 large shareholders. From this perspective, our variable Number of large shareholders, indicating a total number of dominant and block shareholders, should not exceed 5 in order to not lose its implication of control. Hence, we eliminated all firms with more than 5 large shareholders. Another case relates to the age of the firms. For example, some firms, especially among Hungarian agricultural and service companies, date their beginning to before World War 2. For the sake of a robustness check, we also eliminated such old firms. Finally, following the same logic, we also eliminated firms with an excessive number of board directors and subsidiaries.
The above procedure resulted in a reduction of the sample by 1,534 firms. We reestimated all of the models, including those with different assumptions of survival distribution, based on a reduced data set. The results of our robustness check are presented in Appendix Tables A.2 to A.5. The outcome of this exercise is that our main results are robust with respect to the reduction of the data sample conditioned on some firms' characteristics, as the main results are practically the same.
Conclusions
We analyzed the issue of firm survival after the global financial crisis in four new EU member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), employing a large and detailed firm-level data set. Based on the Cox hazards model, we detected a number of firm survival determinants. We confirmed the validity of several determinants in accord with earlier literature. At the same time, we also found several firm-specific determinants 17 that affect the probability of survival in the new EU firms. Our main results may be summarized as follows.
First, significant preventive factors exist that increase the probability of firm survival in at least three of the four countries in our sample. The Number of large shareholders, Number of board directors, and Solvency ratio improve firm survival probability for firms in all four countries. Foreign ownership and ROA both increase firm survival in all countries except Slovakia. On the other hand, the legal form of the Limited liability company is a significant preventive factor only for Hungarian firms.
Second, we identified several significant risk factors that lower the probability of firm survival and, thus, increase the probability of firm exit across the countries. In terms of corporate governance, a board of directors that is too large seems to be detrimental because the squared term of the Number of board directors lowers firm survival probability in all four new EU countries. Two other factors negatively impact firm survival in three countries except Hungary: Firm size and when a firm employs an
International audit firm.
Third, several other determinants exhibit a specific influence on firms in each of the countries studied. This fact emphasizes that differences in business conditions are important when studying firm survival. Hence, we believe that studying the new EU member states and their transformed economies provides several useful insights for practitioners and policy makers. Some of our results are in line with other studies in this area of research. However, we have also found some specific impacts that contradict even some of the stylized facts about firm survival. One strikingly surprising result is that employing an international audit firm lowers the survival probability of new EU companies. a ROA is computed using the following formula: (profit before tax/total assets) × 100 b Profit margin is computed using the following formula: (gross profit/operating revenue) × 100 c Solvency ratio is computed using the following formula: (shareholders' funds/total assets) × 100 ) 17690.28 *** number of firms. Regression coefficients are hazard ratios. Standard errors are computed using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. z-statistics are reported in parentheses beneath the hazard ratios. The Wald test examines the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix
